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Abstract
In this work, the problem of transmitting an i.i.d Gaussian source over an i.i.d Gaussian wiretap
channel with an i.i.d Gaussian side information available at the intended receiver is considered. The
intended receiver is assumed to have a certain minimum SNR and the eavesdropper is assumed to have
a strictly lower SNR, compared to the intended receiver. The objective is to minimize the distortion of
source reconstruction at the intended receiver. In this work, it is shown that the source-channel separation
coding scheme is optimum in the sense of achieving minimum distortion. Two hybrid digital-analog
Wyner-Ziv coding schemes are then proposed which achieve the minimum distortion. These secure joint
source-channel coding schemes are based on the Wyner-Ziv coding scheme and wiretap channel coding
scheme when the analog source is not explicitly quantized. The proposed secure hybrid digital-analog
schemes are analyzed under the main channel SNR mismatch. It is proven that the proposed schemes
can give a graceful degradation of distortion with SNR under SNR mismatch, i.e., when the actual SNR
is larger than the designed SNR.
Index Terms
MMSE Distortion, Hybrid Digital-Analog Coding, Secure Wireless Communication, Wiretap Chan-
nel, SNR Mismatch, Threshold Effect.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information theoretic secrecy in communication systems was first introduced in
[1]. The information theoretic secrecy requires that the received signal by an eavesdropper not
provide any information about the transmitted messages. Following the pioneering works of [2]
and [3] which have studied the wiretap channel, many extensions of the wiretap channel model
have been considered from a perfect secrecy point of view (see e.g., [4]–[8]). Particularly, in
[9], [10], the Gaussian wiretap channel of [11] is extended to the Gaussian wiretap channel with
side information available at the transmitter.
All extensions of the wiretap channel model have considered communicating a discrete source
with perfect secrecy constraint. In many applications, however, a bandlimited analog source needs
to be transmitted on a bandlimited Gaussian wiretap channel with side information available at
the receiver. In many situations, the exact signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the main channel may
not be known at the transmitter. Usually, a range of the main channel SNR is known but the
true SNR value is unknown. Given a range of main channel SNR, such that the eavesdropper’s
signal is degraded with respect to the legitimate receiver’s signal, it is desirable to design a
single transmitter which has a robust performance for all ranges of SNRs. A common method
of designing such a system is based on Shannon’s source-channel separation coding: Quantize
the analog source and then transmit the resulting discrete source by the digital secret wiretap
channel coding scheme. The main advantage of a digital system is that it is more reliable and
cost efficient.
The inherent problem of digital systems is that they suffer from a severe form of ”threshold
effect” [12], [13]. This effect may be briefly described as follows: The system achieves a certain
performance at a certain designed SNR. When the SNR is increased, however, the system
performance does not improve and it degrades drastically when the true SNR falls below the
designed SNR. The severity of the threshold effect in digital systems is related to Shannon’s
source-channel separation principle [14]. Recent works on non-secure communication systems,
however, have proven that joint source-channel coding schemes can not only outperform the
digital systems for a fixed complexity and delay, they are also more robust against the SNR
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variations. [15]–[20].
Some other schemes that exploit the advantage of analog systems are studied in [21]–[24] and
[25]. These works are based on the so-called direct source-channel mapping technique which may
briefly be explained as follows: the output of a source scalar/vector quantizer is mapped directly
to a channel symbol using analog (or nearly analog) modulation, i.e., amplitude modulation or
M-ary quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM). The direct source-channel codes have graceful
degradation performance at low SNRs. In [25], a robust image coding system is presented which
combines subband coding and QAM. This system allows various compression levels based on
block-wise classification. An improved image coding system is then proposed in [22] which
utilizes both bandwidth compression and bandwidth expansion mappings, where the bandwidth
expansion mapping employs a quantization error.
In [17], several hybrid digital-analog joint source-channel coding scheme are proposed for
transmitting a Gaussian source over a (non-secure) Gaussian channel (without side information).
The main idea in [17] for increasing robustness is to reduce the number of quantization intervals,
and thereby increase the distance between the decision lines of the quantization levels. This will
increase the distortion, but in order to compensate the coarser representation, the quantization
error is sent as an analog symbol using a linear coder (see also [26]). In [27], different coding
schemes are analyzed for transmitting a Gaussian source over a Gaussian wiretap channel
(without side information). For a fixed information leakage rate to the eavesdropper, [27] has
shown that superimposing the secure digital signal with the analog (quantization error) part has
better performance compared to the separation based scheme and the uncoded scheme. In [28],
the problem of transmitting a Gaussian source over a (non-secure) Gaussian channel with side
information (either at transmitter or at receiver) is studied. [28] has introduced several hybrid
digital-analog forms of the Costa and Wyner-Ziv coding ( [29]) schemes. In [28], the results of
[30] are extended to the case in which the transmitter or receiver has side information, and have
shown that there are infinitely many schemes for achieving the optimal distortion. In the work
of [31], we considered the problem of transmitting a Gaussian source over a secure Gaussian
channel with side information available at the transmitter and proposed different secure joint
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source channel coding schemes based on the secret dirty paper coding and wiretap channel
coding scheme.
In this paper, we consider the problem of transmitting an i.i.d Gaussian source over an i.i.d
Gaussian wiretap channel with side information available at the intended receiver. We assume
that the intended receiver has a certain minimum SNR and the eavesdropper has a strictly lower
SNR compared to the intended receiver. We are interested in minimizing the distortion of source
reconstruction at the intended receiver. We show that, here, like the Gaussian wiretap channel
without side information, Shannon’s source-channel separation coding scheme is optimum in the
sense of achieving the minimum distortion. We then propose two hybrid digital-analog secure
joint source-channel coding schemes which achieve the minimum distortion. Our coding schemes
are based on the Wyner Ziv coding scheme and wiretap channel coding scheme when the analog
source is not explicitly quantized. We will illustrate that these schemes achieve the optimum
distortion. We analyze our secure hybrid digital-analog schemes under the main channel SNR
mismatch. We will show that our proposed schemes can give a graceful degradation of distortion
with SNR under SNR mismatch, i.e., when the actual SNR is larger than the designed SNR.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND RELATED WORKS
A. Notation
In this paper, random variables are denoted by capital letters (e.g. X) and their realizations are
denoted by corresponding lower case letters (e.g. x). The finite alphabet of a random variable is
denoted by a script letter (e.g. X ) and its probability distribution is denoted by P (x). Similarly,
the function P (x, y) represents the joint probability distribution function of the random variables
X and Y . The vectors will be written as xn = (x1, x2, ..., xn), where subscripted letters denote
the components and superscripted letters denote the vector. The notation xji denotes the vector
(xi, xi+1, ..., xj) for j ≥ i. A Gaussian Random variable X with a mean of µ and variance of σ2
is denoted by X ∼ N (µ, σ2). The function E[.] represents a statistical expectation. The function
I(X ; Y ) represents mutual information between random variables X and Y and A∗(n)ǫ denotes
the set of strongly jointly typical sequences.
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B. System Model And Problem Statement
Source Model: Consider a memoryless Gaussian source of {Vi}∞i=1 with zero mean and vari-
ance σ2v . Thus, Vi ∼ N (0, σ2v) and we assume that the sequence {Vi} is independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d). We assume that the source is obtained from uniform sampling
of a continuous-time Gaussian process with bandwidth Ws(Hz). Furthermore, we assume that
the sampling rate is 2Ws samples per second.
Channel Model: The source is transmitted over an Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN)
wiretap channel when the intended receiver has some side information about the source. The
channel is therefore modeled as follows:
Yi= Xi +Wi, (1)
Zi= Xi +W
′
i ,
Vi= V
′
i + Ti,
where Xi, Yi, and Zi are the channel input, the received signal by the intended receiver and
the received signal by the eavesdropper, respectively. We assume that E[X2i ] ≤ P , and Wi ∼
N (0, N1), W ′i ∼ N (0, N2), where N2 > N1. Furthermore, assume that Ti’s are a sequence of
real i.i.d Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance σ2t , i.e. Ti ∼ N (0, σ2t ). Here
V
′
i and Ti are mutually independent Gaussian random variables. As the source, side information
and the channel are i.i.d over the time, we will omit the index i throughout the rest of the
paper. The channel is derived from a continuous-time AWGN wiretap channel with bandwidth
Wc(Hz). The equivalent discrete-time channel is used at a rate of 2Wc channel uses per second.
The block diagram of the system is depicted in Fig.1.
Coding Scheme: The source samples are grouped into blocks of size m
V m = (V1, V2, ..., Vm),
and the encoder is a mapping fm : Rm → Rn which satisfies the power constraint E[‖fm(V m)‖2] ≤
nP . Let us define the parameter ρ = n/m = Wc/Ws. In this paper we assume that ρ = 1, i.e.,
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the secure joint source-channel coding problem with side information known at the receiver.
m = n. The received signals by the intended receiver and the eavesdropper are given by
Y n = Xn +W n, (2)
Zn = Xn +W
′n,
where Xn = fn(V n), W n ∼ N (0, N1In), W ′n ∼ N (0, N2In), and In is the n×n identity matrix.
The decoder at the intended receiver is a mapping gn : Rn → Rn. The average squared-error
distortion of the coding scheme at the intended receiver is given by
D¯n(fn, gn, N1, N2) =
1
n
E[‖V n − Vˆ n‖2], (3)
where Vˆ n = gn(Y n). For the purpose of analysis, we will consider sequences of codes (fn, gn),
where n is increasing. The asymptotic performance of the code is given by
D¯(N1, N2) = lim
n→∞
D¯n(fn, gn, N1, N2). (4)
Note that the above D¯ is also a function of σ2v > 0, P > 0, σ2t > 0, and ρ > 0, but we assume
that these parameters are known and fixed, and therefore express D¯ as a function of (N1, N2).
In subsequent sections, we refer to D¯ as mean-squared distortion and omit the bar superscript
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and denote it by D, i.e., D = D¯.
Secrecy Requirements: The eavesdropper obtains Zn. The secrecy of the system is measured
by the information leaked to the eavesdropper and is expressed as follows
Iǫ =
1
n
I(V n;Zn). (5)
Note that Iǫ = 0 corresponds to the perfect secrecy condition and implies that the eavesdropper
obtains no information about the source. In this paper we consider the situation in which the
leakage information Iǫ is known and is a fixed constant.
Distortion Exponent: In practical scenarios, the transmitter usually does not have an exact
knowledge of the actual noise power at the intended receiver and the eavesdropper. The trans-
mitter, however, knows an upperbound for the noise power of the intended receiver and also
knows a lowerbound for the noise power of the eavesdropper. Let us denote the upperbound
noise power of the intended receiver and the lowerbound noise power of the eavesdropper by
N1 and N2, respectively. Therefore, the transmitter designs its coding scheme based on the noise
power of N1 and N2 such that N1 ≥ N1a and N2 ≤ N2a, where N1a and N2a are the actual
noise variances corresponding to the actual SNR1a = PN1a and SNR2a =
P
N2a
, respectively.
The eavesdropper channel is still a degraded version of the main channel and is assumed to
have the lowest SNR2a < SNR2 < SNR1 < SNR1a, where SNR2 = PN2 and SNR1 =
P
N1
.
The intended receiver is assumed to have a perfect estimate of SNR1a, but the transmitter
communicates at a lower designed SNR1. In this scenario, we expect a graceful degradation of
distortion D(SNR1a, SNR2) with SNR1a compared with D(SNR1, SNR2) when the actual
SNR1a > SNR1. Let us define the distortion exponent as follows:
Definition 1: For a fixed SNR2, the distortion exponent of D(SNR1a, SNR2) is given by
ζ
△
= − lim
SNR1a→∞
logD(SNR1a, SNR2)
logSNR1a
. (6)
The highest possible distortion exponent is ρ and therefore, 0 ≤ ζ ≤ ρ. The distortion exponent
can be used as a criterion for the robustness of a coding scheme. A high distortion exponent
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means that the coding scheme is more robust against the case of SNR mismatch where we design
the scheme to be optimal for a channel noise variance of N1, but the actual noise variance is N1a.
In this paper, we propose two robust coding schemes which achieve the optimum mean-squared
distortion and analyze them for SNR mismatch. Before introducing our proposed schemes, we
need to review some related works in this area.
C. Related Works
1) Digital Wiretap Channel: In a digital wiretap channel (without any interference S), a digital
message M ∈ {1, 2, ..., nCs} is transmitted to the intended receiver while the eavesdropper is kept
ignorant. Wyner in [2] characterized the secrecy capacity of this channel when the eavesdropper’s
channel is degraded with respect to the main channel. Csiszar et. al. in [3] considered the general
wiretap channel and established its secrecy capacity. Let us assume X , Y and Z to be the channel
input, intended receiver’s signal and eavesdropper’s signal, respectively. The secrecy capacity of
a wiretap channel is given by
Cs = max
P (u,x)
2Wc [I(U ; Y )− I(U ;Z)] , (7)
where U → X → Y Z forms a Markov chain. When the channels are AWGN, [11] has shown
that the secrecy capacity is given by
Cs = Wc
[
log(1 +
P
N1
)− log(1 + P
N2
)
]
. (8)
Here, we briefly explain the coding scheme. We Generate 2nI(U ;Y ) Gaussian codewords Un and
throw them uniformly at random into 2nCs bins. Each bin thus contains 2nI(U ;Z) codeword Un. To
encode the message M ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2Cs} randomly choose a Un from the bin which is indicated
by M and send it. The intended receiver seeks for a Un which is jointly typical with Y n and
declares the bin index as the transmitted message. The probability of error asymptotically tends
to be zero, i.e., limn→∞ Pe(Mˆ 6= M)→ 0. The information leakage is limn→∞ 1nI(M ;Zn) = 0.
When Iǫ is not zero but is a fixed known constant, we have the following Lemma:
Lemma 1: In a digital wiretap channel, the information leakage rate to the eavesdropper is Iǫ
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for the rate of
RIǫ= Cs + Iǫ (9)
= Wc
[
log(1 +
P
N1
)− log(1 + P
N2
)
]
+ Iǫ.
Proof: Let M be the secret message. The transmission rate is then given by
RIǫ =
H(M)
n
. (10)
According to the security analysis of [13], by applying Theorem 1 of [13] to our problem setup
we obtain the following inequality,
H(M |Zn)
n
≤Wc
[
log(1 +
P
N1
)− log(1 + P
N2
)
]
. (11)
By combining (10) and (11), we have
RIǫ
H(M |Zn)
H(M)
≤ Wc
[
log(1 +
P
N1
)− log(1 + P
N2
)
]
. (12)
The left side of the above inequality can be simplified as follows:
RIǫ
H(M |Zn)
H(M)
= RIǫ
H(M |Zn)−H(M) +H(M)
H(M)
(13)
(a)
= RIǫ
H(M)− nIǫ
H(M)
(b)
= RIǫ − Iǫ,
where (a) follows from the definition of Iǫ in (5), and (b) follows from (10). Thus, we can
bound RIǫ as
RIǫ ≤Wc
[
log(1 +
P
N1
)− log(1 + P
N2
)
]
+ Iǫ. (14)
Therefore, the maximum rate for RIǫ can be obtained by choosing
RIǫ = Wc
[
log(1 +
P
N1
)− log(1 + P
N2
)
]
+ Iǫ. (15)
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2) Digital Wyner-Ziv Coding: Consider a (non-secure) source coding problem with side
information known at the receiver. The rate distortion function with side information RV ′ (D)
is defined as the minimum rate required to achieve distortion D if the side information V ′ is
available to the decoder. Precisely, RV ′ (D) is the infimum of rates R such that there exist maps
in fn : Vn → {1, ..., 2nR}, and gn : V ′n × {1, ..., 2nR} → Vn such that
lim
n→∞
supEd(V n, gn(V
′n, fn(V
n))) ≤ D. (16)
Wyner-Ziv coding scheme achieved the entire curve RV ′ (D) as in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: [2] [Rate distortion with side information] Let (V, V ′) be drawn i.i.d. according
to the joint distribution p(v, v′) and let d(vn, vˆn) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 d(vi, vˆi) be given. The rate distortion
function with side information is given by
RV ′ (D) = min
p(u|v)
min
g
{
I(U ;V )− I(U ;V ′)
}
(17)
where the minimization is over all functions g : V ′ × U → Vˆ and conditional probability mass
functions p(u|v), |U| ≤ |V|+ 1, such that
∑
v
∑
u
∑
v
′
p(v, v
′
)p(u|v)d(v, g(v′, u)) ≤ D. (18)
The function g in the theorem corresponds to the decoding map that maps the encoded version
of the V symbols and the side information V ′ to the output alphabet. We minimize over all
conditional distributions on U and functions g such that the expected distortion for the joint
distribution is less than D. Here, we briefly explain the Wyner-Ziv achievability scheme: Fix
p(u|v) and the function g(u, v′). Calculate p(u) =∑v p(v)p(u|v).
Codebook Generation: Let R1 = I(V ;U) + ǫ. Generate 2nR1 i.i.d. codewords Un(s) ∼∏n
i=1 p(ui), and index them by s ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR1}. Let R2 = I(U ;V )−I(U ;V
′
)+5ǫ. Randomly
assign the indices s ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nR1} to one of 2nR2 bins using a uniform distribution over the
bins. Let B(i) denote the indices assigned to bin i. There are approximately 2n(R1−R2) indices
10
in each bin.
Encoding: Given a source sequence V n, the encoder looks for a codeword Un(s) such that
(V n, Un(s)) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ . If there is no such Un, the encoder sets s = 1. If there is more than
one such s, the encoder uses the lowest s. The encoder sends the index of the bin in which s
belongs.
Decoding: The decoder looks for a Un(s) such that s ∈ B(i) and (Un(s), V ′n) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ . If
it finds a unique s, it then calculates Vˆ n, where Vˆi = f(Ui, V
′
i ). If it does not find any such s
or more than one such s, it sets Vˆ n = vˆn, where vˆn is an arbitrary sequence in Vˆn. It does not
matter which default sequence is used; it is shown that the probability of this event is small.
III. SEPARATION BASED SCHEME WITH WYNER-ZIV CODING AND THE PURE ANALOG
SCHEME
In this section, we first analyzed the separation based scheme in which the source is initially
quantized and then transmitted using an optimum channel coding scheme. Next, we evaluate
an uncoded analog scheme in which an optimum scaling version of the the source signal is
transmitted.
A. secure digital Wyner-Ziv coding scheme
In this section we consider the problem described in Fig. 1. We use a separation scheme with
an optimum Wyner-Ziv code followed by an optimum channel code. We refer to this scheme as
the ”secure digital Wyner-Ziv coding scheme”. We show that this scheme achieves the optimum
possible distortion.
If we suppose that the side information V ′ is also available at the encode, the transmitter
therefore requires sending the remaining information T . In [6] the rate distortion problem for
Shannon cipher system is considered. It can be seen from Theorem 1 in [6] by setting Rk = 0,
the Shannon cipher system reduces to the wiretap channel setup and the optimum distortion
can be achieved by separate source coding followed by digital wiretap channel coding scheme.
Therefore, for a fixed leaked information Iǫ we first need to quantize the source T n to T nq at
11
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Fig. 2. a) Block Diagram of the Encoder of the Separation Based Scheme. b) Block Diagram of the Analog Encoder.
a rate Cs = 12 log
(
1 + P
N1
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 + P
N2
)
and then transmit V nq . Thus, we can achieve the
optimum distortion of
D∗= σ2t 2
−2(Cs+Iǫ) (19)
=
σ2t
(1 + P
N1
)/(1 + P
N2
)22Iǫ
.
In the problem of Fig.1., assume that a genie informs the transmitter about the side information
V
′
. Therefore, the above distortion is an upperbound for the problem of Fig.1, i.e., D∗ is the
minimum possible value for distortion D = E
[
‖V − Vˆ ‖2
]
. We show that the same distortion
can be achieved in the setup of Fig.1 by using the secure digital Wyner-Ziv coding scheme.
Fig.2. a) shows the separation based scheme. The following theorem illustrates this result.
Theorem 2: In the problem of secure transmitting a discrete-time Gaussian analog source over
a Gaussian wiretap channel with side information known at the intended decoder, a separation
based scheme can achieve the optimum distortion of D∗.
Proof: The achievability scheme is secure digital Wyner-Ziv coding scheme. Let U be an
auxiliary random variable given by
U =
√
αV + F, (20)
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where F ∼ N (0, D). We generate an n-length i.i.d Gaussian codebook U with 2nI(U,V ) code-
words, where each component of a codeword is Gaussian with zero mean and variance ασ2v+D.
We then evenly distribute them into 2nRV ′ (D) bins, where RV ′ (D) = I(U ;V ) − I(U ;V
′
). Let
i(un) be the index of the bin containing un. For each vn, find a un such that (un, vn) are strongly
jointly typical, i.e., (un, vn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ . The index i(un) is the Wyner-Ziv source coding index. The
transmitter then encoded the index i(un) using an optimal secure channel code of rate arbitrary
close to Cs and transmit it over the channel. The receiver decodes the index i(un) with high
probability. Next for the decoded i(un) we look for an un in the bin whose index is i(un) such
that (un, v′n) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ . We make an estimate for source vn from the decoded un and v′n as
follows:
vˆn =
(
λ1 λ2
) un
v
′n
 , (21)
where we need to determine λ1 and λ2 such that the distortion D = E{|vn− vˆn|2} is minimized.
After some math, the optimum values for λ1 and λ2 are as follows:
λ1=
√
α (22)
λ2= 1− α,
and the related distortion is given by
D = (1− α)σ2t . (23)
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To calculate the coefficient α, note that
RV ′ (D)= I(U ;V )− I(U ;V
′
) (24)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
ασ2v
D
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
ασ2
v
′
ασ2t +D
)
=
1
2
log
(
D + ασ2v
ασ2t + ασ
2
v
′ +D
ασ2t +D
D
)
(a)
=
1
2
log
(
ασ2t +D
D
)
,
where (a) follows from the fact that σ2v = σ2v′ + σ
2
t .
According to the fact that RV ′ (D) must be equal to Cs + Iǫ we have,
α =
D
σ2t
[
22Iǫ
P +N1
P +N2
N2
N1
− 1
]
. (25)
From (23) and (25) the achieved distortion is given by
D=
σ2t
22Iǫ P+N1
P+N2
N2
N1
(26)
= D∗
B. Uncoded Scheme
In this section we analyze a simple uncoded scaling scheme (Fig.2. b)) in which the transmitter
signal is given by
X = αV, (27)
where α ≤
√
P
σ2v
. The intended receiver’s and the eavesdropper’s signals are therefore given by
Y= αV +W, (28)
Z= αV +W
′
.
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For a fixed leakage information, Iǫ is given as follows:
Iǫ = I(V ;Z) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
α2σ2v
N2
)
. (29)
From the above equation we can see that the choice of α =
√
P
σ2v
results in a reasonably high
information leakage rate. We can, however, reduce the value of α to satisfy our fixed information
leakage to the eavesdropper. Therefore, α is given by
α =
√
N2(22Iǫ − 1)
σ2v
. (30)
The intended receiver makes an estimation of V based on the received signal Y and the side
information V ′ . The estimated signal is therefore as follows:
Vˆ= λ1Y + λ2V
′ (31)
= αλ1V + λ1W + λ2V
′
.
The corresponding distortion Du is given by
Du= E
[∣∣∣Vˆ − V ∣∣∣2] (32)
= E
[
(αλ1 − 1)V + λ1W + λ2V ′
]
= (αλ1 − 1)2 σ2v + λ21N1 + λ22σ2v′ + 2λ2 (αλ1 − 1)σ2v′ .
After some algebra, the optimum values for λ1 and λ2 which minimize distortion Du are are
given as follows:
λ1=
ασ2t
N1 + α2σ
2
t
(33)
λ2=
N1
N1 + α2σ2t
.
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By substituting (30) and (33) into (32), the minimum distortion in this uncoded scheme is given
by
Du =
σ2t
1 +
σ2
t
σ2v
N2
N1
(22Iǫ − 1)
. (34)
IV. SECURE JOINT SOURCE-CHANNEL CODING SCHEMES WITH SIDE INFORMATION AT
THE RECEIVER
In this section, we propose two different secure joint source-channel coding schemes which
achieve the minimum distortion of D∗. The first proposed scheme does not involve quantizing
the source explicitly while the second proposed scheme is a superimposed digital and the first
hybrid scheme.
A. Secure Hybrid Digital-Analog Wyner-Ziv Coding Scheme
In this scheme, the encoder does not quantize the source explicitly, however it treats the source
signal as a digital message. We generate the auxiliary random variable U as follows:
U = X + kV, (35)
where k is defined as k2 = 1
σ2
t
[
PN2
P+N2
22Iǫ − PN1
P+N1
]
and X ∼ N (0, P ).
Codebook Generation: We generate a random i.i.d codebook U with 2nI(U ;V ) sequences, where
the components of the codewords are zero mean Gaussian random variables with variance P +
k2σ2v . We then distribute the generated codewords into 2nR bins. This codebook is shared between
the encoder and the intended receiver’s decoder.
Encoding: For a given vn the transmitter finds un’s such that (un, vn) are strongly jointly
typical, i.e., (un, vn) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ . The transmitter randomly chooses one of un and then sends
xn = un − kvn. This is possible with arbitrary high probability if R > I(U ;V )− I(U ;V ′)
Decoding: The intended receiver’s signal is yn = xn + wn. The intended decoder finds a
un such that (v′n, yn, un) ∈ A∗(n)ǫ . A unique such un can be found with high probability if
R < I(U ;V
′
, Y )−I(U ;Z). We next show that we can choose R to satisfy I(U ;V )−I(U ;V ′) <
16
R < I(U ;V
′
, Y ) − I(U ;Z). Equivalently, we show that with k2 = P 2(N2−N1)
σ2
t
(P+N1)(P+N2)
, we have
I(U ;V )− I(U ;V ′) < I(U ;V ′ , Y )− I(U ;Z). Note that after some manipulation
I(U ;V )− I(U ;V ′)= 1
2
log
(
P + k2σ2v
P
)
− 1
2
log
(
P + k2σ2v
P + k2σ2t
)
=
1
2
log
(
P + k2σ2t
P
)
,
and
I(U ;V
′
, Y )− I(U ;Z) = 1
2
log
(
1 + P
σ2v
σ2t
N2 −N1
N2 (P +N1)
)
.
It is easy to see that for k2 = 1
σ2
t
[
PN2
P+N2
22Iǫ − PN1
P+N1
]
, always we have I(U ;V ) − I(U ;V ′) <
I(U ;V
′
, Y ) − I(U ;Z). The intended decoder therefore can estimate the transmitted signal vn
from un, v′n, and yn as follows:
vˆ =
(
λ1 λ2 λ3
)
un
v
′n
yn
 , (36)
where
(
λ1 λ2 λ3
)
are the coefficients of the linear MMSE estimate which minimize D =
E
[
‖V − Vˆ ‖2
]
. After some math, the optimum choices for the coefficients the the related
distortion given as
λ1=
kσ2t
k2σ2t +
PN1
P+N1
(37)
λ2=
PN1
P+N1
k2σ2t +
PN1
P+N1
λ3=
−Pkσ2t
k2σ2t (P +N1) + PN1
D=
σ2t
P+N1
P+N2
N2
N1
22Iǫ
(38)
= D∗
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Channel Encoder
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V
+
X1
X2
XV ∗
2
Fig. 3. Block Diagram of the Encoder of the Superimposed Digital and Hybrid Digital-Analog Wyner-Ziv Scheme
B. Superimposed Secure Digital and Secure Hybrid Wyner-Ziv Coding Scheme
In this scheme, the transmitted signal is a superposition of two signals X1 and X2, which
are the outputs of a digital Wyner-Ziv encoder and a hybrid digital-analog encoder, respectively.
Fig.3. illustrates the streams of the transmitter for this scheme.
The first stream uses a digital rate R Wyner-Ziv code to quantize the source signal assuming
that the side information V ′ is known at the receiver. The discrete quantized index is then
encoded using an optimal wiretap channel code to produce the codeword X1. We allocate the
following power to this stream
PWZ =
(P +N1) (P +N2)
(
1− 2−2R)
P +N2 − (P +N1) 2−2R . (39)
The second stream uses the previous proposed hybrid digital-analog Wyner-Ziv scheme and
produces the output signal X2. The auxiliary random variable of this scheme is given by
U = k1V +X2, (40)
where X2 and V are independent and X2 ∼ N (0, PHWZ), where the allocated power to this
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stream is given by
PHWZ =
N2 (P +N1) 2
−2R −N1 (P +N2)
P +N2 − (P +N1) 2−2R . (41)
We also chose k21 as follows
k21 =
1
σ2t
[
PHWZN2
PHWZ +N2
22Iǫ − PHWZN1
PHWZ +N1
]
, (42)
where σ2
t˜
= σ2t 2
−2R
.
The two streams of X1 and X2 are superimposed at the transmitter through the channel. The
received signal at the intended receiver is is given by Y = X1 +X2 +W . The intended decoder
first decodes X1 by assuming that X2 +W is an independent noise and extracts the Wyner-Ziv
encoded bits (index). Next, along with the side information V ′ , the intended decoder maked an
estimate of the source. Let us denote this estimation by V˜ . The source signal and the estimated
signal of V˜ are related as follows:
V = V˜ + T˜ , (43)
where σ2
t˜
can be calculated as follows. Let us denote the quantized signal by V ∗. Thus,
V = V ∗ + E, (44)
where E is the quantization error and E ∼ N (0, σ2v2−2R) is independent of V ∗. The intended
receiver knows the signals V ∗ and V ′ , where
V = V
′
+ T. (45)
Let Λ be the covariance matrix of (V ∗, V ′)T and Γ be the correlation between V and (V ∗, V ′)T .
Then Λ and Γ are given by
Λ =
 σ2v∗ σ2v∗σ2v′σ2v
σ2
v∗
σ2
v
′
σ2v
σ2
v
′
 and Γ = (σ2v∗ σ2v′) (46)
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Therefore,
σ2
t˜
= σ2v − ΓTΛ−1Γ (47)
= σ2t 2
−2R.
When the digital part is first decoded and canceled from the intended receive signal, we have
an equivalent channel for the hybrid digital-analog Wyner-Ziv scheme with power constraint of
PHWZ . The intended receiver finally makes an estimate of V using hybrid digital-analog Wyner-
Ziv decoder from the new side information V˜ . The observe equivalent channel is Y − X1.
According to the previous subsection, the achievable distortion is given as follows:
D=
σ2
t˜
PHWZ+N1
PHWZ+N2
N2
N1
22Iǫ
(48)
(a)
=
σ2t 2
−2R
(P+N1)2−2R
P+N2
N2
N1
22Iǫ
=
σ2t
P+N1
P+N2
N2
N1
22Iǫ
= D∗,
where (a) follows from (41). The optimal distortion D∗ can be achieved for any rate R which
0 ≤ R ≤ C, where C = 1
2
log
(
P+N1
P+N2
N2
N1
)
is the capacity of the wiretap channel. Therefore,
there are infinitely many schemes which achieve the optimal distortion. In the special case that
PHWZ = P (and therefore R = 0) this scheme converts to the scheme of pervious subsection.
Similarly, when PHWZ = 0 (or equivalently R = C), this scheme is equivalent to the separated
based scheme.
V. SNR MISMATCH ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our propose secure hybrid digital-analog Wyner-
Ziv schemes for the case of SNR mismatch where we design the scheme to be optimal for a
designed SNR1 such that SNR2 < SNR1 < SNR1a, but the actual SNR is SNR1a. It is
well known that separation based scheme suffers from a pronounced threshold effect; when the
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actual SNR is worse than the designed SNR, the index cannot be decoded and when the actual
SNR is better than the designed SNR, the distortion is limited by quantization and therefore,
the distortion does not improve. We show that however our proposed secure joint source-channel
coding schemes offer better performance in this situation.
Let us first consider our first proposed secure joint source-channel coding scheme. The intended
receiver can decode un when the SNR1a is better than the designed SNR1 and make an estimate
of the source from the observations at the receiver. The signals are given as follows:
U= X + kV (49)
V= V
′
+ T
Y= X +Wa
Z= X +W
′
,
where k =
√
1
σ2
t
[
PN2
P+N2
22Iǫ − PN1
P+N1
]
, W ∼ N (0, N1a). The intended receiver uses an optimal
linear MMSE to estimate the transmitted signal V from the observations of [U, V ′, Y ]. Note that
this receiver knows the exact value of N1a, but the transmitter chooses the parameter k based
on the designed N1. Let Λ be the covariance matrix of (U, V
′
, Y )T and Γ be the correlation
between V and (U, V ′, Y )T . Thus,
Λ =

P + k2σ2v k(σ
2
v − σ2t ) P
k(σ2v − σ2t ) σ2v − σ2t 0
P 0 P +N1a
 (50)
and
Γ =
(
kσ2v σ
2
v − σ2t 0
)T
. (51)
The coefficients of the linear MMSE estimate are given by Λ−1Γ. After some math, the actual
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distortion is then given by
Da= σ
2
v − ΓTΛ−1Γ (52)
= σ2v −
k2σ2vσ
2
t (P +N1a) + (σ
2
v − σ2t )PN1a
k2σ2t (P +N1a) + PN1a
=
σ2tPN1a
k2σ2t (P +N1a) + PN1a
(a)
=
σ2tN1a[
N2
P+N2
22Iǫ − N1
P+N1
]
[P +N1a] +N1a
,
where (a) follows by substituting k. As we can see, this scheme has the distortion exponent
ζ = 1.
Now let us consider the superimposed secure digital and secure hybrid Wyner-Ziv coding
scheme. The intended receiver can decode the digital part (X1) when the actual SNR1a is better
than the design SNR1. When the digital part is decoded and canceled from the intended receiver
signal of Y = X1 + X2 +Wa, we have an equivalent hybrid digital-analog Wyner-Ziv coding
scheme with the side information of V˜ (see equation (43)) available at the intended receiver
and the power constraint of PHWZ (see equation (41)). The achievable distortion at the intended
receiver is therefore given by
Da = σ
2
v − ΓTΛ−1Γ, (53)
where here Λ is the covariance matrix of (U, V˜ , Y −X1)T and Γ is the correlation between V
and (U, V˜ , Y −X1)T , where U and k1 are given in (40) and (42), respectively. Thus,
Λ =

PHWZ + k
2
1σ
2
v k1(σ
2
v − σ2t˜ ) PHWZ
k1(σ
2
v − σ2t˜ ) σ2v − σ2t˜ 0
PHWZ 0 PHWZ +N1a
 (54)
and
Γ =
(
k1σ
2
v σ
2
v − σ2t˜ 0
)T
. (55)
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The coefficients of the linear MMSE estimate are given by Λ−1Γ. After some math, the actual
distortion is then given by
Da= σ
2
v − ΓTΛ−1Γ (56)
= σ2v −
k21σ
2
vσ
2
t˜
(PHWZ +N1a) +
(
σ2v − σ2t˜
)
PHWZN1a
k21σ
2
t˜
(PHWZ +N1a) + PHWZN1a
=
σ2
t˜
PHWZN1a
k21σ
2
t˜
(PHWZ +N1a) + PHWZN1a
(a)
=
σ2
t˜
N1a[
N2
PHWZ+N2
22Iǫ − N1
PHWZ+N1
]
[PHWZ +N1a] +N1a
(b)
=
σ2t 2
−2R[
N2
N1a(PHWZ+N2)
22Iǫ − N1
N1a(PHWZ+N1)
]
[PHWZ +N1a] + 1
(c)
=
σ2t 2
−2R
N222Iǫ (N2−N1a)(P+N1)2−2R+(P+N2)(N1a−N1)
N1a(N2−N1)(P+N2)
− N1(N2−N1a)(P+N1)2−2R+(P+N2)(N1a−N1)
N1a(N2−N1)(P+N1)2−2R
+ 1
where (a) follows by substituting k1, (b) follows by substituting σ2t˜ = σ
2
t 2
−2R
, and (c) follows
by substituting PHWZ from (41). As we can see, this scheme has the distortion exponent ζ = 1.
It is useful to mention that for the uncoded scheme of section III-B, the distortion is given
by (34) which may be written as follows:
Du =
σ2t
1 +
σ2
t
σ2v
N2
P
(22Iǫ − 1)SNR1a
. (57)
Though the above equation shows that the distortion exponent ζ is 1, we have a considerable loss
in optimality at the intended receiver, as we have not used the full power P at the transmitter.
Fig. 4 Compares the performance of the secure hybrid coding scheme, superimposed scheme
and the analog coding scheme with the separation based scheme. In this figure, P = 10, SNR1 =
10, SNR2 = 7, 10 ≤ SNR1a ≤ 50, Iǫ = 0.2, R = 0.15, σ2v = 8, and σ2t = 5. As shown in this
figure, our proposed hybrid schemes provide the optimum distortion when the transmitter has
the exact value of the SNR1a and is more robust against the SNR mismatch compared with
digital Wyner-Ziv Coding scheme.
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Fig. 4. Performance of the secure hybrid digital-analog Wyner-Ziv coding scheme compared with the separation based scheme.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We considered the problem of transmitting an i.i.d Gaussian source over an i.i.d Gaus-
sian wiretap channel with side information available at the intended receiver. We showed that
Shannon’s source-channel separation coding scheme is optimum in the sense of achieving the
minimum distortion. We then proposed two hybrid digital-analog secure joint source-channel
coding schemes which achieve the minimum distortion. Our coding schemes were based on
the Wyner Ziv coding scheme and wiretap channel coding scheme when the analog source
is not explicitly quantized. We analyzed our secure hybrid digital-analog schemes under the
main channel SNR mismatch and showed that that our proposed schemes can give a graceful
degradation of distortion with SNR under SNR mismatch, i.e., when the actual SNR is larger
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than the designed SNR.
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